

## SENATE VOTES ON IRAQ JULY 2007

On July 11, 2007, the U.S. Senate took a series of votes on various measures related to the war in Iraq. The text of the proposed amendments follow the vote tally.

**S. Amdt 2012 Cloture --** Senator Webb introduced an amendment that required that U.S. troops returning to the U.S. from Iraq be at their home base in the U.S. for at least as long as the length of their tour in Iraq. For example, if a unit had been deployed in Iraq for 12 months that unit would have to be at its home base for at least 12 months before being redeployed to Iraq. The vote was on a cloture motion to end debate on the measure and bring it to the full Senate floor for a vote. A “Yes” vote indicates support for a full Senate vote on the measure and is indicative of support for the measure.

**S Amdt 2032 – Introduced by Senator Hagel.** This amendment would limit the length of deployment to Iraq to 12 months for units of the Army, Army National Guard and Army Reserve and to 7 months for units of the Marine Corps and Marine Corps Reserve. While a majority of Senators voted for this amendment, it failed to pass since (after the cloture vote on S. Amdt. 2012) it was agreed that a minimum of 60 votes would be required for the amendment to pass and be attached to the bill. This was done to avoid repeated cloture votes.

**S Amdt 2073 – Introduced by Senator Lieberman.** This amendment focuses upon Iran and would require the U.S. Commander of the Multinational Forces in Iraq and the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq to report to Congress on the role of Iran inside of Iraq.

**S Amdt 2078 – Introduced by Senator Graham.** This amendment states that members of the Armed Forces returning from Iraq should be allowed at least 12 months of time before being deployed once again to Iraq, but it does not require that a minimum of 12 months expire before such deployment back to Iraq.

State	Name	First	Party	S Amdt 2012 - Cloture	S Amdt 2032	S Amdt 2073	S Amdt 2078
AK	Murkowski	Lisa	R	N	N	Y	Y
AK	Stevens	Ted	R	N	N	Y	Y
AL	Sessions	Jeff	R	N	N	Y	N
AL	Shelby	Richard	R	N	N	Y	Y
AR	Lincoln	Blanche	D	Y	Y	Y	N
AR	Pryor	Mark	D	Y	Y	Y	N
AZ	Kyl	Jon	R	N	N	Y	Y
AZ	McCain	John	R	N	N	Y	Y
CA	Boxer	Barbara	D	Y	Y	Y	N
CA	Feinstein	Dianne	D	Y	Y	Y	N
CO	Allard	Wayne	R	N	N	Y	Y
CO	Salazar	Ken	D	Y	Y	Y	N
CT	Dodd	Christopher	D	Y	Y	Y	N
CT	Lieberman	Joseph	I	N	N	Y	Y
DE	Biden	Joseph	D	Y	Y	Y	N
DE	Carper	Thomas	D	Y	Y	Y	N
FL	Martinez	Mel	R	N	N	Y	Y
FL	Nelson	Bill	D	Y	Y	Y	N
GA	Chambliss	Saxby	R	N	N	Y	Y
GA	Isakson	Johnny	R	N	N	Y	Y

State	Name	First	Party	S Amdt 2012 - Cloture	S Amdt 2032	S Amdt 2073	S Amdt 2078
HI	Akaka	Daniel	D	Y	Y	Y	N
HI	Inouye	Daniel	D	Y	Y	Y	N
IA	Grassley	Charles	R	N	N	Y	Y
IA	Harkin	Tom	D	Y	Y	Y	N
ID	Craig	Larry	R	N	N	Y	Y
ID	Crapo	Mike	R	N	N	Y	Y
IL	Durbin	Richard	D	Y	Y	Y	N
IL	Obama	Barack	D	Y	Y	Y	N
IN	Bayh	Evan	D	Y	Y	Y	N
IN	Lugar	Richard	R	N	N	Y	Y
KS	Brownback	Sam	R	NV	NV	NV	NV
KS	Roberts	Pat	R	N	N	Y	Y
KY	Bunning	Jim	R	N	N	Y	Y
KY	McConnell	Mitch	R	N	N	Y	Y
LA	Landrieu	Mary	D	Y	Y	Y	N
LA	Vitter	David	R	NV	NV	NV	NV
MA	Kennedy	Edward	D	Y	Y	Y	N
MA	Kerry	John	D	Y	Y	Y	N
MD	Cardin	Benjamin	D	Y	Y	Y	NV
MD	Mikulski	Barbara	D	Y	Y	Y	N
ME	Collins	Susan	R	Y	N	Y	N
ME	Snowe	Olympia	R	Y	Y	Y	N
MI	Levin	Carl	D	Y	Y	Y	N
MI	Stabenow	Debbie	D	Y	Y	Y	N
MN	Coleman	Norm	R	Y	N	Y	Y
MN	Klobuchar	Amy	D	Y	Y	Y	N
MO	Bond	Christopher	R	N	N	Y	Y
MO	McCaskill	Claire	D	Y	Y	Y	N
MS	Cochran	Thad	R	N	N	Y	Y
MS	Lott	Trent	R	N	N	Y	Y
MT	Baucus	Max	D	Y	Y	Y	N
MT	Tester	Jon	D	Y	Y	Y	N
NC	Burr	Richard	R	N	N	Y	Y
NC	Dole	Elizabeth	R	N	N	Y	Y
ND	Conrad	Kent	D	Y	Y	Y	N
ND	Dorgan	Byron	D	Y	Y	Y	N
NE	Hagel	Chuck	R	Y	Y	Y	N
NE	Nelson	Ben	D	Y	Y	Y	N
NH	Gregg	Judd	R	N	N	Y	Y
NH	Sununu	John	R	Y	N	Y	N
NJ	Lautenberg	Frank	D	Y	Y	Y	N
NJ	Menendez	Robert	D	Y	Y	Y	N
NM	Bingaman	Jeff	D	Y	Y	Y	N
NM	Domenici	Pete	R	N	N	Y	Y
NV	Ensign	John	R	N	N	Y	Y
NV	Reid	Harry	D	Y	Y	Y	N
NY	Clinton	Hillary	D	Y	Y	Y	N
NY	Schumer	Charles	D	Y	Y	Y	N
OH	Brown	Sherrod	D	Y	Y	Y	N

State	Name	First	Party	S Amdt 2012 - Cloture	S Amdt 2032	S Amdt 2073	S Amdt 2078
OH	Voinovich	George	R	N	N	Y	N
OK	Coburn	Tom	R	N	N	Y	Y
OK	Inhofe	James	R	N	N	Y	Y
OR	Smith	Gordon	R	Y	Y	Y	N
OR	Wyden	Ron	D	Y	Y	Y	N
PA	Casey	Robert	D	Y	Y	Y	N
PA	Specter	Arlen	R	N	N	Y	Y
RI	Reed	Jack	D	Y	Y	Y	N
RI	Whitehouse	Sheldon	D	Y	Y	Y	N
SC	DeMint	Jim	R	N	N	Y	Y
SC	Graham	Lindsey	R	N	N	Y	Y
SD	Johnson	Tim	D	NV	NV	NV	NV
SD	Thune	John	R	N	N	Y	Y
TN	Alexander	Lamar	R	N	N	Y	Y
TN	Corker	Bob	R	N	N	Y	Y
TX	Cornyn	John	R	N	N	Y	Y
TX	Hutchison	Kay Bailey	R	N	N	Y	Y
UT	Bennett	Robert	R	N	N	Y	Y
UT	Hatch	Orrin	R	N	N	Y	Y
VA	Warner	John	R	Y	N	Y	Y
VA	Webb	James	D	Y	Y	Y	N
VT	Leahy	Patrick	D	Y	Y	Y	N
VT	Sanders	Bernard	I	Y	Y	Y	N
WA	Cantwell	Maria	D	Y	Y	Y	N
WA	Murray	Patty	D	Y	Y	Y	N
WI	Feingold	Russ	D	Y	Y	Y	N
WI	Kohl	Herbert	D	Y	Y	Y	N
WV	Byrd	Robert	D	Y	Y	Y	N
WV	Rockefeller	John	D	Y	Y	Y	N
WY	Barrasson	John	R	N	N	Y	Y
WY	Enzi	Michael	R	N	N	Y	Y

## **S. AMDT 2012 – SENATOR WEBB**

Introduced by Senator Webb

Co-Sponsors: Senators Hagel, Reid, Levin, Durbin, Murray, Schumer, Clinton, Obama, Byrd, Tester, McCaskill, Kennedy, Kerry, Salazar, Harkin, Feinstein, Brown, Lincoln, Pryor, Sanders, Boxer, Klobuchar, Mikulski, Cantwell, Dodd, Akaka, Biden, Stabenow, and Landrieu.

**SEC. 1031. MINIMUM PERIODS BETWEEN DEPLOYMENT FOR UNITS AND MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES FOR OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM AND OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM.**

(a) Minimum Period for Units and Members of the Regular Components.--

(1) **IN GENERAL.**--No unit or member of the Armed Forces specified in paragraph (3) may be deployed for Operation Iraqi Freedom or Operation Enduring Freedom (including participation in the NATO International Security Assistance Force (Afghanistan)) unless the period between the deployment of the unit or member is equal to or longer than the period of such previous deployment.

(2) **SENSE OF CONGRESS ON OPTIMAL MINIMUM PERIOD BETWEEN DEPLOYMENTS.**--It is the sense of Congress that the optimal minimum period between the previous deployment of a unit or member of the Armed Forces specified in paragraph (3) to Operation Iraqi Freedom or Operation Enduring Freedom and a subsequent deployment of the unit or member to Operation Iraqi Freedom or Operation Enduring Freedom should be equal to or longer than twice the period of such previous deployment.

(3) **COVERED UNITS AND MEMBERS.**--The units and members of the Armed Forces specified in this paragraph are as follows:

- (A) Units and members of the regular Army.
- (B) Units and members of the regular Marine Corps.
- (C) Units and members of the regular Navy.
- (D) Units and members of the regular Air Force.
- (E) Units and members of the regular Coast Guard.

(b) Minimum Period for Units and Members of the Reserve Components.--

(1) **IN GENERAL.**--No unit or member of the Armed Forces specified in paragraph (3) may be deployed for Operation Iraqi Freedom or Operation Enduring Freedom (including participation in the NATO International Security Assistance Force (Afghanistan)) if the unit or member has been deployed at any time within the three years preceding the date of the deployment covered by this subsection.

(2) **SENSE OF CONGRESS ON MOBILIZATION AND OPTIMAL MINIMUM PERIOD BETWEEN DEPLOYMENTS.**--It is the sense of Congress that--

- (A) the units and members of the reserve components of the Armed Forces should not be mobilized continuously for more than one year; and

(B) the optimal minimum period between the previous deployment of a unit or member of the Armed Forces specified in paragraph (3) to Operation Iraqi Freedom or Operation Enduring Freedom and a subsequent deployment of the unit or member to Operation Iraqi Freedom or Operation Enduring Freedom should be five years.

(3) COVERED UNITS AND MEMBERS.--The units and members of the Armed Forces specified in this paragraph are as follows:

(A) Units and members of the Army Reserve.

(B) Units and members of the Army National Guard.

(C) Units and members of the Marine Corps Reserve.

(D) Units and members of the Navy Reserve.

(E) Units and members of the Air Force Reserve.

(F) Units and members of the Air National Guard.

(G) Units and members of the Coast Guard Reserve.

(c) Waiver by the President.--The President may waive the limitation in subsection (a) or (b) with respect to the deployment of a unit or member of the Armed Forces specified in such subsection if the President certifies to Congress that the deployment of the unit or member is necessary to meet an operational emergency posing a threat to vital national security interests of the United States.

(d) Waiver by Military Chief of Staff or Commandant for Voluntary Mobilizations.--

(1) ARMY.--With respect to the deployment of a member of the Army who has voluntarily requested mobilization, the limitation in subsection (a) or (b) may be waived by the Chief of Staff of the Army (or the designee of the Chief of Staff of the Army).

(2) NAVY.--With respect to the deployment of a member of the Navy who has voluntarily requested mobilization, the limitation in subsection (a) or (b) may be waived by the Chief of Naval Operations (or the designee of the Chief of Naval Operations).

(3) MARINE CORPS.--With respect to the deployment of a member of the Marine Corps who has voluntarily requested mobilization, the limitation in subsection (a) or (b) may be waived by the Commandant of the Marine Corps (or the designee of the Commandant of the Marine Corps).

(4) AIR FORCE.--With respect to the deployment of a member of the Air Force who has voluntarily requested mobilization, the limitation in subsection (a) or (b) may be waived by the Chief of Staff of the Air Force (or the designee of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force).

(5) COAST GUARD.--With respect to the deployment of a member of the Coast Guard who has voluntarily requested mobilization, the limitation in subsection (a) or (b) may be waived by the Commandant of the Coast Guard (or the designee of the Commandant of the Coast Guard).

## **S. AMDT 2032 – SENATOR HAGEL**

Introduced by Senator Chuck Hagel

Co-sponsors: Senators Levin, Snowe, Webb and Reid

### **SEC. 1535. LIMITATION ON LENGTH OF DEPLOYMENTS FOR OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM.**

(a) Limitation.--Commencing 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the deployment of a unit or individual of the Armed Forces for Operation Iraqi Freedom shall be limited as follows:

(1) In the case of a unit or individual of the Army (including a unit or individual of the Army National Guard or the Army Reserve), the unit or individual may not be deployed, or continued or extended on deployment, for more than 12 consecutive months.

(2) In the case of a unit or individual of the Marine Corps (including a unit or individual of the Marine Corps Reserve), the unit or individual may not be deployed, or continued or extended on deployment, for more than 7 consecutive months.

(b) Exception.--The limitation in subsection (a) shall not apply to designated key command headquarters personnel or other members of the Armed Forces who are required to maintain continuity of mission and situational awareness between rotating forces.

(c) Waiver Authority.--The President may waive the applicability of the limitation in subsection (a) in the event of a requirement for the use of military force in time of national emergency following consultation with the congressional defense committees.

(d) Deployment Defined.--In this section, the term "deployment" has the meaning given that term in subsection 991(b) of title 10, United States Code.

## S. Amdt. 2073 – Senator Lieberman

Introduced by Senator Joe Lieberman

Co-Sponsors: Senators McCain, Kyl, Graham, Coleman, Collins, Sessions, Levin, Salazar, Craig

### SEC. 1535. REPORT ON SUPPORT FROM IRAN FOR ATTACKS AGAINST COALITION FORCES IN IRAQ.

(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:

(1) Since January 19, 1984, the Secretary of State has designated the Islamic Republic of Iran as a "state sponsor of terrorism," one of only five countries in the world at present so designated.

(2) The Department of State, in its most recent "Country Reports on Terrorism," stated that "Iran remained the most active state sponsor of terrorism" in 2006.

(3) The most recent Country Reports on Terrorism report further stated, "Iran continued [in 2006] to play a destabilizing role in Iraq ..... Iran provided guidance and training to select Iraqi Shia political groups, and weapons and training to Shia militant groups to enable anti-Coalition attacks. Iranian government forces have been responsible for at least some of the increasing lethality of anti-Coalition attacks by providing Shia militants with the capability to build IEDs with explosively formed projectiles similar to those developed by Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard was linked to armor-piercing explosives that resulted in the deaths of Coalition Forces."

(4) In an interview published on June 7, 2006, Zalmay Khalilzad, then-United States ambassador to Iraq, said of Iranian support for extremist activity in Iraq, "We can say with certainty that they support groups that are attacking coalition troops. These groups are using the same ammunition to destroy armored vehicles that the Iranians are supplying to Hezbollah in Lebanon. They pay money to Shiite militias and they train some of the groups. We can't say whether Teheran is supporting Al Qaeda, but we do know that Al Qaeda people come here from Pakistan through Iran. And Ansar al Sunna, a partner organization of Zarqawi's network, has a base in northwest Iran."

(5) On April 26, 2007, General David Petraeus, commander of Multi-National Force-Iraq, said of Iranian support for extremist activity in Iraq, "The level of financing, the level of training on Iranian soil, the level of equipping some sophisticated technologies ..... even advice in some cases, has been very, very substantial and very harmful."

(6) On April 26, 2007, General Petraeus also said of Iranian support for extremist activity in Iraq, "We know that it goes as high as [Brig. Gen. Qassem] Suleimani, who is the head of the Qods Force. .... We believe that he works directly for the supreme leader of the country."

(7) On May 27, 2007, then-Major General William Caldwell, spokesperson for Multi-National Force-Iraq, said, "What we do know is that the Iranian intelligence services, the Qods Force, is in fact both training, equipping, and funding Shia extremist groups ..... both in Iraq and also in Iran. .... We have in detention now people that we have captured that, in fact, are Sunni extremist-related that have, in fact, received both some funding and training from the Iranian intelligence services, the Qods Force."

(8) On February 27, 2007, in testimony before the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate, Lieutenant General Michael Maples, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, said of Iranian support for extremist activity in Iraq, "We believe Hezbollah is involved in the training as well."

(9) On July 2, 2007, Brigadier General Kevin Bergner, spokesperson for Multi-National Force-Iraq, stated, "The Iranian Qods Force is using Lebanese Hezbollah essentially as a proxy, as a surrogate in Iraq."

(10) On July 2, 2007, Brigadier General Bergner detailed the capture in southern Iraq by coalition forces of Ali Musa Daqdaq, whom the United States military believes to be a 24-year veteran of Lebanese Hezbollah involved in the training of Iraqi extremists in Iraq and Iran.

(11) The Department of State designates Hezbollah a foreign terrorist organization.

(12) On July 2, 2007, Brigadier General Bergner stated that the Iranian Qods Force operates three camps near Teheran where it trains Iraqi extremists in cooperation with Lebanese Hezbollah, stating, "The Qods Force, along with Hezbollah instructors, train approximately 20 to 60 Iraqis at a time, sending them back to Iraq organized into these special groups. They are being taught how to use EPFs [explosively formed penetrators], mortars, rockets, as well as intelligence, sniper, and kidnapping operations."

(13) On July 2, 2007, Brigadier General Bergner stated that Iraqi extremists receive between \$750,000 and \$3,000,000 every month from Iranian sources.

(14) On July 2, 2007, Brigadier General Bergner stated that "[o]ur intelligence reveals that senior leadership in Iran is aware of this activity" and that it would be "hard to imagine" that Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of Iran, is unaware of it.

(15) On July 2, 2007, Brigadier General Bergner stated, "There does not seem to be any follow-through on the commitments that Iran has made to work with Iraq in addressing the destabilizing security issues here in Iraq."

(16) On February 11, 2007, the United States military held a briefing in Baghdad at which its representatives stated that at least 170 members of the United States Armed Forces have been killed, and at least 620 wounded, by weapons tied to Iran.

(17) On January 20, 2007, a sophisticated attack was launched by insurgents at the Karbala Provincial Joint Coordination Center in Iraq, resulting in the murder of five American soldiers, four of whom were first abducted.

(18) On April 26, 2007, General Petraeus stated that the so-called Qazali network was responsible for the attack on the Karbala Provincial Joint Coordination Center and that "there's no question that the Qazali network is directly connected to the Iranian Qods force [and has] received money, training, arms, ammunition, and at some points in time even advice and assistance and direction".

(19) On July 2, 2007, Brigadier General Bergner stated that the United States Armed Forces possesses documentary evidence that the Qods Force had developed detailed information on the United States position at the Karbala Provincial Joint Coordination Center "regarding our soldiers' activities, shift changes, and defenses, and this information was shared with the attackers".

(20) On July 2, 2007, Brigadier General Bergner stated of the January 20 Karbala attackers, "[They] could not have conducted this complex operation without the support and direction of the Qods Force."

(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--

(1) the murder of members of the United States Armed Forces by a foreign government or its agents is an intolerable and unacceptable act of hostility against the United States by the foreign government in question; and

(2) the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran must take immediate action to end all training, arming, equipping, funding, advising, and any other forms of support that it or its agents are providing, and have provided, to Iraqi militias and insurgents, who are contributing to the destabilization of Iraq and are responsible for the murder of members of the United States Armed Forces.

(c) Report.--

(1) IN GENERAL.--Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 60 days thereafter, the Commander, Multi-National Forces Iraq and the United States Ambassador to Iraq shall jointly submit to Congress a report describing and assessing in detail--

(A) the external support or direction provided to anti-coalition forces by the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran or its agents;

(B) the strategy and ambitions in Iraq of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran; and

(C) any counter-strategy or efforts by the United States Government to counter the activities of agents of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Iraq.

(2) FORM.--Each report required under paragraph (1) shall be in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.

## **S. Amdt. 2078 – Senator Graham**

### **SEC. 1031. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON DWELL TIME BETWEEN DEPLOYMENTS FOR MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES.**

It is the sense of Congress that--

(1) the wartime demands placed on the men and women of the Armed Forces, both in the regular and reserve components, and upon their families and loved ones, since the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, have required the utmost in honor, courage, commitment, and dedication to duty, and the sacrifices they have made and continue to make in the defense of our nation will forever be remembered and revered;

(2) members of the Armed Forces who have completed combat deployments require as much certainty as possible about the amount of time they will be at their home stations before commencing a subsequent extended operational deployment; and

(3) the goal, consistent with wartime requirements, for dwell time between extended operational deployments of members of the Armed Forces should be--

(A) for members of the regular components of the Armed Forces, no less 12 months between deployments; and

(B) for members of the reserve components of the Armed Forces, no less than 5 years between deployments.